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I.	 OBdECS" TVE
The ob^^ective of this study was to determine and compare the reliabilities
of various redundant configurations of SNAP-8 and SNAP-2 electrical generating
systems. A number of assumptions were made to facilitate the statist^,cal calcu-
lations; these a^,ssumptions are listod in the discussican.
II o
	
CCNCLITSIQN
The number of SNAPo ^ systems required to provide equiva^lc^nt power at a
reliability equal to that of a SNAP- 8 system is such that this> approach becomes
impractical, even y.t` switching and other auxiliary functions wer^^a ^.00^ reliable.
III, SUMMARY
-	 There are two basic redundant con^igurationss active-parallel and.
sequential. In an active-parallel system, all units are operating at once 9 and. the
total-output capability exceeds the system requirements. As units fail, the avail
able output .drops until it equals the overall system requiremmenta The failure of
one additional unit then results • i^ a; system output bestow requirements, and vhe
system is considered to have failed.
	 ^^^•:
-^	 -^ In a sequential system, only enough units ^o melt system out^aut requirements
are intia-1--ly opers,ted. A number of spares are • availat^le which .are used to repla^,e
the original units as they fail. Aft®r the last spare has b®®n used ' the next
failure-results^in an output below system requirem®nt^s, and a system :failure has
occurred. If perfect failure-sensing and switching devices are used, the reliability
of a s®quential configuration will be somewhat higher than that of an active parallel
syst^sm having the same total number of un^.ts. This results from the fact that the
^,.^- -- -^..
^^,,.
extra units in a sequential system are not sub^E;ct to failure during their standby
period, whereas in an active system, all units are experiencing the failure rate.
A more complex analysis stems from the fact that extra units in a sequential
system do experience same smaller failure rate when in a standby condition. This
failure rate is the result of meteoroids and other mission conditions which affect
both operating and. nonoperating^units. Consequently, the ga.ir. in reliability of a
sequential system over an active system is less than that which would otherw:tse
be obtained.
The reliabilities of a number of redundant configurations have been computed.
These include both active-parallel and sequential configurations. '.rhe results are
summarized below.
A Q	 BASIC CRITERIA
System (EGS)
Operating Reliability (10,000 hr)
Standby Reliability (10,000 hr)
Output
SNAP-8 	 SNAR-^
^-
.800	 .800
.960	 .960
35 lsw	 3 kw or '
^^
#Re"liability of .960 = failure rate (FR) of .0108
Bo	 OPTIONS
to	 System Reliability = .80 -- One SNAP-8
 System = ,800
EQUiva.lent SNAP-2 Systems
Power 3 kw (36 total) ^ kw (35 total)
Configuration Number Reliabilit Number Reliabil^.t^
Active Paralle^ 16 .798. 910
^.
.73^
.879
Sequential (no stando
by FR.)
15
^ 16
.719
,.866
g
.^ _
. 793.
	 .
Sequential (standby
FR	 .0108) 1516
.706
.853 9
X
783
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2Q	 System Reliability = .96 -- Two SNAP-8
 Systems in Active
Parallel-Redundancy = .960
Eou_valent SNAP-2 Svstems
Power 3 kw C36 total) 5 kw C35 total)
Configuration N^unber Reliability Number Reliabilit
Active Parallel 'l8 •948
l9 .977 it .950
Sequential (no standy- 17 . 945 10 .926	 9
b	 ^'R) 18 „980 11 0 978
Sequential (standby 17
.935 10 .917
FR = 00408 18
^
11 .973
3,	 System Reliability = .98 -- Two SNAP-8
 Systems in Sequential
Redundancy = .979 (No Standby Failure Rate)
Equiva^tent SNAP-2 Svstems
Power 3 kw (36 total)
,..^^:
5 ^^ (35 total)
Configuration Number Reliabilit Number Reliability
Active Parallel 19 .977
.^
12 .981
Sequential (no stand- 18 ^^0980	 4 ll 0978by ^^
Sequential (standby l8
^_,
0973 l^ 11 0972FR = 00408
,^
4Q	 System ,Reliability = .975 -^- Two SNAP- B
 Systems in Sequent^^al
Redundancy = .9?5 (Standby FR = .0408}
Eouivalent SNAP-2 Svstems
Power 3 kw C36 total 5 ^ (35 total
Configuration Number eliability Number	 -
m
Relis:b^l^.^.t
^!lctive Parallel 19
.97? 12 0981
^aequential (no stand-
Xay FR)
18
,9^0 11. .9?8
,^
._S; u^^tial ( standby 18 0973 11 097FR	 .o4oe
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IV.	 DISCUSSION
A. SCOPE OF REDUNDANCY STUDY
There are numerous technical problems associated with any redundant
system, particularly one as complex^as an EGS. The nature anc% scope of these
problems, however, were not the subject of this study. A major program would be
necessary ±^o determine, investigate, and resolve even the most immediate problema.
Another possible consideration is the application of redundancy to
subsystems or components, either instead of redundancy on an EGS level, or as a
supplement to it. For example, an FGS consisting of one reactor and two power
conversion systems could be evalaxatESd; cr the possible use of two L/C pump-motor
assemblies could be investigated. Again, this study did not undertake the analysis
of these possibilities; but wa.s limi'^ed to redundancy considerations at the EGS
level.
B. ASSU^'"TIONS IN REDUNDANCY ANALYSIS
to	 The reliability of the detection a.nd switching functions is
perfect 9
 ioeo, 1000, That is 9
 these functions do not contri®
bute to the overall system fa3.lure rate which is determined
only by the 1eliability of the EGS (SNAP^B or SNAPm2) elements
and the redundancy configuration. This assumption may be made
because the relative contribution of detection and switching
devices to the overall system failure rate is small compared.
to the contribution of the EGS o s (perhaps an order of magnitude
smaller) o Secondly e
 since the relative. rEaliabili'^ies of two
alternate systems are being compared9 whatever small failure
rates may exist for these functions, to .some degree 9
 tend to
balance out.
2.	 The standby systems are subject to the same constant failure
rat® from meteoroids as the operating systems throughout the
entire mission lifea The reliability of one unit with respect
to meteoroids is .96 for the mission life, corresponding to a
Page 4
.	 failure rate a^f .0l^08 per 10,000 hours ( l^.08 x 10 6 per hr) .
Vacuum, temperature, radiation, ^.nd other space environments are
assumed to have no effect on the reliability or longevity of
-	 nonoperatin^ systems. (Any effec^;s would be considerably less
than those ^•esul.ting from meteoroids, and can be considered to
be included. in the .0108 standby failure rate.)
3.	 The 10,000 hoar functional reliability for any single system is
.833 from the time that the particular system starts, nc^t from
the start of the mission. That is, the functional failure rate
for an individual EGS is .182. per 10,000 hours (18.24 x 10 6
pex• hour) commencing from the start of that unit' ^ func^,ional.
operation. Thus, the total operational reliability, which is
the product of, the meteoroid reliability x the functional
reliabil:Lty^ = .800.
1^.	 Subjection to launch environments does not ,^.ffect the standby
failure rate. Launch dynamics result in an increase; in the
operating random failure rate from some lower level to 18.2l^ x 10 6
per hour. This assumption, although a simplification of actual_
phenomena, is valid because a random failure rate is the result
of sudden stress accumul^.tiora^ occurring randomly. The relay;i^onm
ship of these stresses to - the ^ strength s of the system deterr^ni.nes
the system failure rate. The effects of launch dynamics are to
lower the system 'strength s and increase the' probability of ran=
dom-stress accumulation exceeding system capabi^.ity during
funct^:onal operation.
^.	 All systems are assumed to operate within their design lives
after debugging and before wsarout. Th® calculations are based 	 t^
on a constant failure rate (exponential reliability functior ► 9	.
R = e ' ^t^  for. a single EOiS unit.
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n = number of units in parallel
(R .^ Q) n = Rn ^, ^n-1Q ^, n (n..l)^Rn-2Q2s
^, n(n-1) (n-2)R
	 Q ^,n-3 3
... (^^
'^
b.	 Failure of one unit will not affect the reliability or
longevity of any of the other units, either operating or non-
operating. That is, there' are ro interactions between redundant
units.. It is assumed that, even in an active-parallel system,
the amount of derating resulting from. additional units sharing
the load is not enough to significantly affect the failure rate
of an individuals unit.
?.	 The mission will nat be affected by the startup +acne required
to attain electrical power output. Either auxiliary power will
be s;vailable^^or^ in the case of SNAP-^, the mission will be
capable of proceeding for short durations at reduced power levels.
8.	 Redundancy is accomplished by switching in a complete EaS,
rather than by redundancy of^selected subsystems, No component
of a failed system ^^^^ ^.1 be used in another system. (Not
necessarily the best approach.)
V.	 CALCULATIONS
A.	 ACTIVE-PARALLEL SYSTEM
The Binomial expansion is applicable = (R + Q)n
where R = reliability of one unit
Q -probability of fs,ilure of qr_e unit = 1-R
1st term is probability of 0 failures
2nd term is probability of exactly l failure
Ord term is probability of exactly 2 failures,
etc.	 '
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System reliability, Rs, is the sum of the first k + 1 terms where k
is the a1^.owabie number of failures. That is, Rs = probability of 0 fail^:res
probability of 1 failure +probability of 2 failures + . .probability of k
failures.
For example; if there are 8 usaits i^ the system and.3 failures are per-
muted, n = 8, k = 3, k + 1 = ^.
Rs = P(0 failures) + P(1 failure) + P(2 failures) + P(3 failures}
_.	 ._^	 ---
Rfor 1 unit = .80
Q for 1 unit = 1 - R = „2
^. •	 35 kw Unit (1 Un9'.t is Required to Provide 3S kw)
n = ^	 Rs = .82 + 2(.8)(02)
.6^0 + .320 =..960
____..
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^l6yCdi	 1	 :'4	 -_
^^
2. ,3 k^r Unit (12 Units are Required to provide 36 kw)
a, n = 15
^5
 = 
,^^5t 15 (^^)r4{2^' -r I5^14)^^) ! t-2a2 ,i,,, 15 14)(I3)(.g ls^,^.
-^
03 52 + , 1319 + ,2309 + .250)
	 _ .6^
b. n = 16
16	 15	 ! 2	 {6 15 (14
 G8 ^ . 3 16(1?aKl^(13u^^?,14
_- ,gab-{ + .I{z6 + . ^I {{ t ,z463 + .2^or	
—^
e. n = 17
	
R S ^ ^$Iy+ 17G>^)!6(Z) -+.	 16 .8 ^s ,2a2 +,i2^{G)^15)GR)1 [•21 .^lZ^.^i	 .813
.f. 17 ib^l5^ 3y. ^
6	 2.
-- 
.D,225 t , p956 t w ^ ^ 1 Fes• + , z.^^ ►
 +a F+^9 2 t , {.7.74	 -- ^S
d. n 18
f 18 (17)(^6)(15)(141f. ^!^(.2}^ + IB[hXI6KI5Y14X13KF^i^f.?a6
	
1 2a	 ^Zo
—' ,a180 + . Ogll t,17z3 t ,2297 t .2-IS^t t ,1''S0^°' t^ ,D^314 = ^^
e, n = l^
^5	 ^= ,8'^ -t- 19 ^,8)18G2^ -!- 19CI9)G8}^'Gz)z ,t. ^lf^: .8) t6 . .^„ 14(!8)(t7)(16)C8)15(.1^42	 5	 24
	
^. 19 18)(17X160( .8 !
	 s 't. {9(IBX17Y720)(^)(^^^^ .t l 9(l6)(^7)[IbYLS)G4)C13X6^2(,2)7
,0144 + ,0685 t ,1540+.21e2. t,21a:3zt .1637 t .9955 t,o4g3 = ^
	
7
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3^ 5 ktir Unit (7 Unite_ are required to provide 35 kFr)
a.	 n -- 9
'^s = , Sq t 9 G>3)8( 2) -;- 9 (8)Ge)' (. 2)^'2,
%-' ,134 .3 + , 3022 t ,.022	 = ,73 q
^5 = .8^^ + 10(,8) 9(•2) + 0	 ,8 8 .	 ,.I„ (OC^i^CB)(..3)^[•'?.^3b
-' .1074 -+' .2684 ^” .3020 + ,,2^D1^3
	 = .87^
c^ n = 11
^5 = .8^^+ IIGS)ioG^) + 1L(10)CZ ) `^(.2)`"t	0	 (.8)6C,?)^,^. (I (10)(.9?(9)(.8)'l.2)^.
— . 0>^5 4 -^- , Z3 E^ z t , z9 53 -^- . 2Z 1 5 t , 1 I0 7	 = • 9 5 Q
d. n = 12
('^	 —	 ^2	 i(	 ,,^ 2 il k	 IOC. ^.^ 12(11)(IO^S)9(?;.t. 1Z.(I11(10)(9) .^)g(.2.^`^
zo
_ .0^8?' '+' ,2062 + ^ 2835 -* , 232'+' ,132q -►' .053,2	 =	 g
„.
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a
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-	 a.	 SEQUEI^TIA,L SYSTEM - NO STANDBY F'AILUaRE RATE
The Poisson distribution is applicable (e	 e = 1),
x 
=	
+ x^ + x3 + x^'since e 1 + x 2Ij	 3^	 ^	 . .
e_.x ex= xx 1+x+'=2 + x3 + x4+(	 2:	 3;	 .)
Let x = ^t = s,^^erage number of failures in time t. This results in
the equation:
e_at 1 
+ ^t + (^t)2 + (^t)3 + 
( ^t) ^ +	 1C	 -^:-	 : ,	 -^i^-;^-	 ^
where R
	
= e^-fit = i,he probability of 0 failures
t.	 Q	 = ^t ( e- ^t`^ = the probability of ea^actly 1 failure
1	 _ (fit) 2	 -fit) -Q^	 ^=^ (e	 -the probability of exactly 2 failures
_ (fit) 3 -- e` `t = the robabilit of exactl 'failuresQ3	 _^i__._ (
	 )	 P	 y	 y 3 _
^^
,.
..	 etc.
Again, system reliabilitg is the sum of the first k + 1 terms where k
is the allowable number of failures:
Rs
 = Probability of 0 failures +probability of 1 failure + . :. .
probability of k failures
The failure rate, lit, Y^ow®ver, is the .
 failure rate of th® operating
system, not the .failure rate of an^individual unit., If there are m units operating,
and each unit has a failure rate a ut, the system failr^re rate ^t = m hut.
R far 1 unit = . 80; ^t = . ^^^
.,
1:	 35 kw Unit; One Unit is Rec^uirdd to Provide 35 kx
n d 2, Rs ,^ a .223 (1' + .223) ^ •979
;J.^	
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(2)
^	 t
2.	 k►r Unit (12 Uriits ire Required to Pro^r.Cde 36 k^r)
_,
-. n= 15
RS _ ^ 2,6777( I + 2.,6777 t 2.6 277 z f 2.66T13 I
I	 "- , 06872 ^ ! + 2..6777 + 3.5850 + 3,1998)
	 _ ^^_
b. n = lb
S _
	 ,2.6777	 ^ z' 2 6777 .2
 2-67774 1R	
^^ + 2.6777 -+' ^1 Z_
• .^' ^ + "'^'
,06872 (I-(2..6777 -r 35850 t3.l^t^ t 214^)	 _ .866
d. n =:17
f^5 = ^.2^7^7 ^ I t 2.6777+ 2 ' Z^ Zt^3-r z^^ + 2,6777 sI ?^
,ob^72 ( I t L,6777 +.3,5A5ot9,i996tz„14.20 ^-1:147!)
	
_-	 45
d,	 n = 18	 .;.
	
2.6777
	 677 ^	 32.6 `^ .1.77 s	 67 76
,06972(1+2.6777 + 3,Seso t3.1916 tz,1420*41471} ar19^
	— .^^.
3•	 5 _ kw Unit (7 U>r^its are ^ Required to Provide 35 Y€^r)
^a.	 n =9
-I.S6Z0	 I.5^02 )	 1Rs = ,.¢.
	
(I + 1.562 -r	 J
.^97z. CI + l^56^0 t (-2200)	 = .793
b. n = 10
	
- 1.5620	 I.S620Z' 1.5620 3
	i
209 7 2 ^ I . '^' I , .^ b ZU i- 1.2 200 t , 6352)	 = ..926
c. n = 11
- 1.56,x,0 y C/
	
I. d6^^	 20 3 1.s62o'4' 
`1
'°" . 20972_^I + 1^5620t +.2200 f :6352 -1- ,.2480) 	 = s^7S	 J
	
Page 11
	
;
__	
- _ _ _
._
^'
b
C.	 SEQUENTIAL SYSTEM - OPERATIONAL FAILITRE RATE _ a lt, STANDBY`
,"^
	
FAILURE RATE _ ^2t
The reliability of a system with one unit in ope:rat3.on and a second
unit on standby is given by:
Rs = e-alt [1 + ^ (1-ela2t)
2
When the numbed of ubits exceeds 2, tht exact formula becomes quite
complex; and the following approximation, which is accurate to three decimal places,
may be used:
R
^	 3R6 ... R^ .^. ^ (R4 - R5 )
'	 .
Rl = reliability of 2 unit sequential system with no
standby .failure rate.	 (From Equation 2)
R^ = reliability of 2 unit sequential system with standby
failure rate (From Equation 3)
R3 = reliability of 2 unit active-parallel sys^"em (Fromm
Equation± 1)
R^ = reliability of n unit sequential system with no standby
failure rate. (From Equation ^)
R5 = reliability of n unit active-parallel system (From
Equation 1)
R6 = re fiability of n nit s^que^ti,al system with standby
ailure rate 2t.	 (This is the unknown quantity)
p.s long as ^ 2t ( Standby FR) is less than lilt ( operational ^'R) , R^ will be between
Rl and R3 , anc^ R6 will. be .between R^ and R5.
_.	 ..	 .:	 ^^
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(^)
^ ^ r,.
^ s
1.	 35 kw unit; one unit is required. to provide 35 kw
Roper^ating 
_ • 800	 (alt = .223)
Rsta.ndby = •960	 (^2t = .0408)
R = .800 [1 + •223 (1 - .960)]
s	 .0 0	 .
_ .800 Cl + . .219] =	 X975
2.	 3 kw unit; 12 units are required to provide 36 kw (from Equation
4, for n = 18)
Rl
 = •979
R2
 = .975
R3 = .4/0
R4 = .980
R5 = .948
R6 = .948 + .. 9 ( •032) =_
3.	 5 kw unit; 7 units are required to provide 36 k^r (from Equation
4 for n = 11}
Rl = .979
R2
 = .975
R3
 - .9E0
R^ _ .978
R5 = .950
R = • 950 +^= ( .02^g) _ • 972	 `6	 ..019	 ---
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